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We show that in device independent quantum key distribution protocols the privacy of randomness
is of crucial importance. For sublinear test sample sizes even the slightest guessing probability by an
eavesdropper will completely compromise security. We show that a combined attack exploiting test
sample and measurement choices compromises the security even with a linear size test sample and
otherwise device independent security considerations. We explicitly derive the sample size needed to
retrieve security as a function of the randomness quality. We demonstrate that exploiting features of
genuinely higher dimensional systems one can reduce this weakness and provide device independent
security more robust against weak randomness sources.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Mn,03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography is one of the most promi-
nent applications of quantum information theory. It
enables a level of security in key distribution that is
unparalleled in classical information theory, as a suc-
cessful eavesdropping would violate fundamental laws
of quantum physics. This is true at least in theo-
retically perfect settings. Specific attacks targeted at
imperfect technical implementations, such as e.g. low
efficiency detectors have shown that there is still a lot
of room for improvement until the application is per-
fected. The original proposals however were still mak-
ing a lot of strong assumptions on the systems used for
cryptography. One can group these approaches in two
classes. Prepare and measure quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) utilizes the fact that measurement is not
possible without disturbance in quantum physics (the
first protocol was proposed in Ref. [1]). The strong as-
sumption here is that one is in perfect control of the
source and measurement apparatuses. Indeed it was
shown that security can be compromised if the source
of the information carriers, or the measurement appa-
ratuses used for interacting with them is manipulated
[3, 4]. In the second type of protocols entanglement
is used to establish a secure key, which due to the
limited shareability of quantum correlations provides
security even if the source of entangled states is in the
hands of an eavesdropper (the first such protocol was
proposed in Ref. [2]). Also in this case however it is
possible to break the security of the protocols if the
eavesdropper also has manipulated the measurement
devices. Fortunately, using device independent veri-
fication of entanglement, one can overcome this flaw
and recent works have focused on device independent
quantum key distribution (DIQKD) (see e.g. Refs. [5–
8]).
All device independent proposals so far have used as-
sumptions about a perfectly uniform randomness be-
ing readily available. In Ref. [10] it was shown that
even a slight imperfection in randomness generation
leads to a possible loophole and even entanglement
based protocols can be compromised. This loophole
however originates in the sublinear size of the test
sample.
The attack of Eve in that paper assumes that Eve is
responsible for the weak randomness and can use her
knowledge of the bias to guess with high probability
in which rounds the security check will be performed
and thus remain undetected. However, this is only
one of the points where the randomness enters the
protocol. The other is the choice of the measurement
settings. As we will see the bad quality of randomness
used there has a big impact on the security. In this
paper we generalize the attack from Ref. [10] and show
that the security of the DIQKD can be compromised,
even when using a linear test sample, if Eve exploits
the min-entropy loss in both the choice of the settings
and the test sample.
We show that below a certain threshold of random-
ness quality key generation is no longer possible with
qubit protocols. Furthermore we propose a scheme
that overcomes this weakness by considering genuinely
high-dimensional entangled systems, that are readily
available in quantum photonics (see e.g. Refs. [12–
16]).
This paper is structured as follows: First we present
the scenario that we are working in and the protocol
that the parties are using. Then we derive the min-
imal violation of the Bell inequality used as a secu-
rity parameter as a function of min-entropy loss rate.
Next we prove the necessity of a feature that any QKD
protocol must have in presence of weak randomness:
a linear size of the test sample. Then we find the suf-
ficient size of the sample for CGLMP [17] testing. We
end with discussing the implications of our work and
the open problems.
2II. THE SETTING
To start let us first specify the setting. Alice and
Bob want to share a secure key. They implement a
protocol under the following conditions
1. Potentially compromised measurement appara-
tus. Alice and Bob have access to quantum
measurement devices, which they cannot trust.
However, following [9], we assume that the ob-
servables measured in the different runs com-
mute.
2. Potentially compromised source of multidimen-
sionally entangled quantum systems.
3. No pre-existing secret key: This is very impor-
tant. If Alice and Bob have some shared secret
bits they could use it as a randomness source
with perfect randomness.
4. Weak randomness: Alice and Bob have poten-
tially compromised sources of randomness. The
min-entropy loss rate of their is L. We assume
that the randomness generators of Alice and
Bob can be correlated.
5. An authenticated classical channel.
Now we specify the protocol that they are going to
implement. It is the standard DIQKD setting. Two
communicating parties are going to use the CGLMP
[17] inequality violation as their security parameter.
To estimate the violation each party has to randomly
choose one of the settings a = 0, 1 for Alice and b =
0, 1 for Bob. To generate the key Bob will use a third
setting b = 2 which gives him outcomes maximally
correlated with Alice’s when she chooses a = 0. The
protocol has N runs. First Bob randomly chooses a
subset of fN of runs where the parties estimate the
parameter. In this subset he chooses settings b = 0 or
1 randomly. In the remaining (1 − f)N runs he uses
b = 2. Alice chooses a = 0 or 1 randomly in all the
runs.
After the measurements for all the runs are com-
plete Bob announces the cases which he used for pa-
rameter estimation. The parties announce the settings
and outcomes for all of these runs and use them to es-
timate the value of the CGLMP inequality violation.
In the remaining (1−f)N runs Alice announces when
she has chosen a = 1 and the parties discard these
runs. Only the cases when a = 0 and b = 2 are used
to generate the key.
This protocol is quite standard for DIQKD apart
from the fact that usually only a number of runs sub-
linear in N is used for the parameter estimation. The
reason why we need a sample of linear size is the weak
randomness in the possession of the parties. From
[10] we already know that Alice and Bob cannot have
any secure protocol with a smaller test sample under
these conditions (and we give the explicit proof for the
DIQKD scenario in the Appendix section (VII A)).
In order to analyze the protocol we take the same
approach as Ref.[10] in quantifying the imperfection
of the randomness using the min-entropy loss rate.
Min-entropy is the measure of choice as any source
generating the bits that has any type of randomness
will also exhibit non-zero min-entropy. This measure
makes our result completely general as it is quite easy
to compute the min-entropy loss rate of any source
specified using a different measure. E.g. Santha-
Vazirani (S-V) sources [18] have a min-entropy loss
rate of L = 1+log(12− ǫ). Therefore, our result can in
a straightforward manner be applied to S-V sources.
The same holds for sources which are bit-fixing, bi-
ased or described by some Renyi entropy [19]. On the
other hand, if we would choose any other measure of
randomness relating it to others would be not pos-
sible, e.g. bit fixing sources, which simply fix some
fraction of the bits in advance and choose the rest at
random, are indistinguishable from a fully determin-
istic one from an S-V point of view.
Let (M, b) denote an imperfect source of random-
ness that creates strings of length M , according to a
probability distribution with min-entropy b. We quan-
tify the bias of the source by the min-entropy loss rate
denoted L = M−b
M
.
III. THE MOST GENERAL ATTACK
EXPLOITING BAD RANDOMNESS IN THE
SIFTED KEY GENERATION
The protocol described above generates sifted key
which can be later turned into the secret key via clas-
sical privacy amplification and error correction proce-
dures. Though these procedures also require random-
ness their analysis falls outside the scope of this paper
and we are interested in the most general attack on
the ”quantum” part of the protocol. First let us focus
on the randomness in the choice of the settings.
The min-entropy loss rate L is the resource that
the adversary uses to attack the protocol. It can be
directly related to her probability of guessing the set-
tings in each round of the protocol. For clarity, we
can divide the guessing in two parts. The first is de-
ciding whether b = 2 or, in other words, whether this
round is used for parameter estimation. The second
is guessing the measurement settings in each round.
The goal of Eve is to learn as much of the sifted
key as possible while remaining undetected. When
b = 2 then the adversary aims at maximizing her cor-
relations with Alice. If b < 2 her aim is to hide her
interference. The limits of her resource make it im-
possible to know the value of b in every round. Since
the strategy optimal for b = 2 gives her more informa-
tion about the key than the one for b < 2 the optimal
attack is to use the strategy for b = 2 even in some
3rounds used for parameter estimation provided that
she can avoid detection.
The strategy optimal for b = 2 is to prepare a prod-
uct state (its details are discussed later) but if L is
large enough we will see that it becomes also the opti-
mal strategy for b < 2. In this case we have no hopes
for security.
Our protocol has two important parameters: the
amount of CGLMP violation and the fraction f of the
rounds used for parameter estimation. Now we find
the lower bounds for both of these as the functions of
L.
IV. BELL INEQUALITY VIOLATION AS A
SECURITY CHECK
In the device independent protocols the key ingre-
dient is the parameter estimation phase where the
parties estimate the violation of the Bell inequality.
However to test it some randomness is required. To
our knowledge, in all the works on device independent
protocols it is assumed that this randomness is per-
fect. The attack presented in [10] used only the fact
that weak randomness can let Eve to choose a sub-
set of runs where she knows that they are not used
for parameter estimation. But weak randomness of
the settings leads to the increase of the local bound
which, in turn, leads to another loophole in quantum
cryptography [20]. Though, apart from [20] there have
been other works that studied the dependence of the
local bound on the input randomness, they have been
either restricted to CHSH [21] or the randomness was
measured in the terms of conditional Shannon entropy
[22]. Therefore, we need to adapt the methods from
[22] to find the local bound on CGLMP as a function
of the min-entropy loss rate.
We start by expressing CGLMP in a ”normalized”
form
1
4
(P (A ≤ B|a = 0, b = 0) + P (B ≤ A|a = 0, b = 1)+
P (A ≤ B|a = 1, b = 1) + P (B < A|a = 1, b = 0)) ≤
3
4
,
(1)
where a and b denote the settings of Alice and Bob
respectively and A and B their outcomes. It is a nor-
malized variant of CGLMP first introduced in [23].
One approach to Bell inequalities is to treat them as
nonlocal games. We can think of the parties receiving
their inputs from the referee who assures them that
they are chosen according to uniform probability dis-
tribution. He can, however, be wrong or lying. What
happens then is Alice and Bob playing the game with
the strategy optimized for the uniform distribution of
settings while they are not. Effectively, they are try-
ing to violate inequality
p00P (A ≤ B|a = 0, b = 0) + p01P (B ≤ A|a = 0, b = 1)+
p10P (A ≤ B|a = 1, b = 1) + p11P (B < A|a = 1, b = 0)
≤ R,
(2)
where pij is the probability of Alice getting setting i
and Bob j. Furthermore, these probabilities change
each round. In the Appendix section (VIIB) we give
the details of the proof that the optimal violation that
can be achieved with product states for a given min
entropy loss rate L is given by
R(L) =
3
4
+
L
2(2− log 3)
. (3)
This bound is plotted on Fig 1 and it becomes the
crucial local bound that Alice and Bob need to violate
if they want to have a chance for security.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Here we plot the maximal expec-
tation value of the normalized CGLMP inequality ,with
product states that are distributed by Eve, as a function
of the min-entropy loss rate L. For comparative purposes
we also include three exemplary violations by maximally
entangled states of dimension d = 2, d = 4 and d = 32. It
follows directly from this relation that if the min entropy
loss rate L exceeds ≈ 0.043, there is no hope of a secure
protocol using qubits.
V. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
However violating the local bound is only a neces-
sary condition for the security. It is known [9] that
the key rate in the DIQKD protocol with commut-
ing observables secure against general attacks is lower-
bounded by
K ≥ Hmin(A|E) −
Npub
Nkey
, (4)
where Hmin(A|E) is the min-entropy rate of the Al-
ice’s bit of key conditioned on Eve’s information, Npub
the amount of communication in the error correction
4and privacy amplification phases and Nkey the length
of the key. In the Appendix sections (VII C,VIID) we
show that the violation of the local bound in CGLMP
inequality implies Hmin(A|E) > 0 and indeed we can
even infer a lower boundH∞(A|E) ≥
Robs−R(L)
2 ln 2 where
Robs is the average value of the CGLMP measured by
the parties.
Error correction and privacy amplification imply
that whenever a = 0 and b = 2 the correlations are
provably perfect. This forces Eve to use the states
that give maximal correlation between the parties for
settings a = 0 and b = 2 as the part of her strategy
optimal for b = 2. It is in contrast with the attack pro-
posed in [10] where in most of the rounds not used for
parameter estimation Eve tries to decrease the correla-
tions between Alice and Bob. This attack can remain
undetected under the assumption of sublinear sample
size.
If the violation of CGLMP is large enough we know
that we can have a secure protocol but we still have
to find out the size of the test sample f .
From the considerations presented earlier we know
that the optimal strategy for Eve is to use the strategy
optimal for b < 2 in kN rounds with k ≤ f and the
strategy optimal for b = 2 in the rest of them. The
strategy optimal for b < 2 is, obviously, to send the
state that violates CGLMP the most for the given
number of outcomes. The strategy optimal for b = 2
is to send the product state |ψ〉. Of course the closer
Eve wants to bring k to f , the more min-entropy loss
L she has to induce
LN =
log
(
N
fN
)
− log
((1−k)N
(1−f)N
)
log
(
N
fN
) , (5)
which for large N approaches
L(k, f) = lim
N→∞
LN =
−f log(f)− (1 − k) log(1− k) + (f − k) log(f − k)
h(f)
,
(6)
where h(.) is Shannon’s binary entropy function.
At the same time the closer k is to f the larger is the
Bell inequality violation that the parties can observe.
In k
f
of the rounds used to estimate CGLMP the state
that violates it maximally for the given number of
outcomes is distributed. Let us denote this violation
by RQ(L, d). In the remaining
f−k
k
rounds the state
distributed is |ψ〉 and, since it is a product state, the
maximal violation is R(L). Therefore the violation
observed can be at most
Robs ≤
k
f
RQ(L, d) +
f − k
f
R(L), (7)
which implies
k ≥ f
Robs −R(L)
RQ(L, d)−R(L)
. (8)
RQ(L, d) is the maximal quantum violation of
CGLMP inequality with d outcomes and the min-
entropy loss rate of the randomness of the settings
L. There are no known methods of finding this value.
However we can always bound it by the algebraic
bound: RQ(L, d) ≤ 1, which implies
k ≥ f
Robs −R(L)
1−R(L)
= k(Robs, L). (9)
Plugging this into (6) we obtain
L ≥ L(k(Robs, L), f), (10)
which can be solved for any value of L giving a lower
and an upper bound on the fraction f of the rounds
used for parameter estimation. There is an upper
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Here we depict the lower bound on
the observed violation Robs for different linear fractions f
and for a fixed value of min-entropy loss rate L = 0.03. As
in this case R(L) = 0.786141 we know we need to observe a
strictly larger violation to provide security, and we see that
if the violation is high enough we can indeed choose any f .
For qubits d = 2 the fundamental limit is Robs ≤ 0.801777,
which fundamentally constrains f ≤ 0.723026, whereas
with d = 4 one can already reach f ≤ 0.999416.
bound due to the fact that f is the fraction of rounds
to be tested with the CGLMP inequality. Here Eve
needs to make sure that she restricts most of them to
a sample space, that she knows with certainty. Coun-
terintuitively it can happen that if f is chosen too
large, that this task actually gets easier for Eve, now
succeeding with her attack.
Now we also need to discuss another lower bound for
f . For N → ∞ this it will also be arbitrarily small
due to infinite precision in the measurement of Robs.
But in every practical scenario we have to face the
fact that we only have a limited number of runs and
Robs will always carry experimental error bars from its
statistical deduction. So depending on the statistical
fidelity which we aim for in a finite number of runs, we
will have to choose a large enough fraction of N runs
5to guarantee that such a precision is possible to attain
in fN runs. This lower bound is easy to calculate for
any specific implementation, but as it depends also on
the experimental settings and errors we do not present
a detailed analysis of this lower bound. We want to
point out, however, that it can in a realistic setting
be significantly larger than the upper bound on f for
qubits.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In conclusion we have shown that even in DIQKD
settings security can be compromised if the local ran-
domness is not uniform. We explicitly derive the
fundamental bounds on the randomness quality in
this setting, and consequently demonstrate that high-
dimensional entanglement is indeed more powerful
than mere qubit entanglement. Thus we have not only
shed light on the role of randomness in the security of
DIQKD protocols but at the same time we have pro-
vided a clear example where the generation of high-
order entanglement opens up new paths in quantum
cryptography.
For the fundamental introduction of the protocol we
have looked at an idealized scenario. We can how-
ever also apply the same reasoning without assuming
perfect correlations (discussed in the Appendix sec-
tion VII E) and even deal with attacks exploiting weak
randomness in the error correction and privacy ampli-
fication phases (see Appendix section VII F) or also
considering different types of entropy loss in the ran-
domness generators. The basis for the improvement
of the protocol remains the same however. A higher
violation of Bell-inequalities through higher dimen-
sions increases the randomness of the outcomes and
strengthens the protocols, while a higher number of
outcomes increases the key rate. A full analysis of
different scenarios is under preparation.
It should also be noted that this protocol is not nec-
essarily only usable in situations where the random-
ness quality exceeds a bound for qubits. If the min-
entropy loss rate is assumed small enough that the
protocol would potentially also be achievable using
qubit systems it still pays off greatly to use the high
order entanglement, due to the fact that with every
measurement multiple bits of key are generated (i.e.
log(d) bits) and there is no downside once such high-
dimensional entanglement is readily available. That
is proven by numerous recent experimental results
that achieve high-order entanglement up to d ≈ 50 in
Ref.[16], which provides more than five bits per mea-
surement outcome. Also there exist different possibil-
ities for implementing such high dimensions in pho-
tonic systems, e.g. in path (Ref. [12]) or a large fam-
ily of orbital angular momentum (OAM) modes (e.g.
Ref [13]).
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VII. APPENDIX
A. Impossibility of sublinear sample size
In the protocol we use a linear size of the test sample for both CGLMP correlations and the ones for a = 0
and b = 2. One could ask if this is indeed necessary. Because the conditions on Eve’s attack and the setting of
our protocol are substantially different from the one presented in [10] we cannot use the attack presented there
to prove the insecurity of the protocol. However we can find an attack which works, with slight modifications
in both settings. Let us start with the device independent one.
If the test sample is of the size N1−α then Eve in can choose a number k such that kN > N1−α. Because we
are interested in the limit of large N ’s k can be chosen arbitrarily small. She exploits weak randomness of the
parties to make sure that the N1−α rounds for CGLMP inequality testing are taken from kN predetermined
rounds. In these rounds Eve sends the state that Alice and Bob hope to have in all of them. In the rest of the
rounds she prepares product state |ψ〉 = |x〉a=0|x〉b=2 where the indexes denote the bases.
In this case the CGLMP inequality violation is estimated only in the rounds where the state is entangled
and, at the same time, the correlations for a = 0 and b = 2 are perfect in all the cases. This means that the
parties will not detect Eve, while H∞(A|E) < k can be made arbitrarily small for large N .
The min-entropy loss rate in this case can also be made arbitrarily small since
lim
N→∞
log
(
N
N1−α
)
− log
(
kN
N1−α
)
log
(
N
N1−α
) = 0. (11)
The version of this attack for the prepare and measure scenario involves Eve not interacting in kN rounds
used to check the correlations and measuring the system in (1− k)N rounds in a random basis and sending the
state that she got to Bob. It also leads to arbitrarily low min-entropy with arbitrarily good randomness.
B. Bell inequality violation as a security check
From [22] we know that the local bound for the CGLMP game played with imperfect randomness is 1 − r
where r = mina,b P (a, b). The lowest amount of min-entropy for a particular value of r is attained by the
distribution
(
r, 1−r3 ,
1−r
3 ,
1−r
3
)
. This leads to the local bound in the terms of min-entropy
R ≤ min
{
3 ∗ 2−H∞(a,b), 1
}
(12)
As soon as this value reaches the quantum bound there is no possibility of the experimental verification that
the measured state is not classical and no hopes for secure QKD. The quantum bound, however, depends on the
dimension of the measurement system and approaches 1 as d→∞ [24]. This value is obtained by min-entropy
of log 3 ≈ 1.585, however the critical value is smaller for any state of finite dimension. The quantum bound on
the normalized CGLMP inequality (eq.(1) in the main paper) is 0.8177 for d = 2 and 0.8516 for d = 5 [23],
which translates to the critical min entropies of 1.875 and 1.817 respectively.
For the experiment repeated many times, in the i-th run the bound is Ri = min
{
3 ∗ 2−H
i
∞ , 1
}
, where Hi
∞
is the min-entropy of the settings in the i-th round conditioned on the events from the setting generation for
the previous rounds. Let us see how big the average R = 1
M
∑M
i=1 Ri can be for a given sum of the entropies
HΣ =
∑M
i=1H
i
∞
. Clearly, it is pointless for the adversary to set Hi
∞
lower than log 3 of any i as it does not
increase the bound. In region H∞ ∈ [log 3, 2] R is convex so the optimal strategy is to use m instances of
settings with entropy log 3 and M −m instances with entropy 2 where
log 3m+ 2(M −m) = HΣ, (13)
7which gives m = 2M−HΣ2−log 3 This will give the local bound
R ≤
1
M
(
m+
3
4
(M −m)
)
=
3
4
+
1− HΣ2M
2(2− log 3)
. (14)
Because the total min-entropy of the source is
H∞ = − log max
a1,...,aM ,b1,...,bM
P (a1, ..., aM , b1, ..., bM ) (15)
= − log max
a1,...,aM ,b1,...,bM
M∏
i=1
P (ai, bi|ai−1, ..., aM , bi−1, ..., bM ) (16)
≤ − log
M∏
i=1
max
ai,bi
P (ai, bi|ai−1, ..., aM , bi−1, ..., bM ) = HΣ (17)
and
L =
2M −H∞
2M
= 1−
H∞
2M
(18)
we get
R ≤
3
4
+
L
2(2− log 3)
= R(L). (19)
C. The sufficiency of the violation of the CGLMP inequality
Lemma 1: The violation of the local bound in CGLMP inequality implies Hmin(A|E) > 0.
Proof. Let us assume that there exists a setting of Alice, say a = 0 such that maxA P (A|a = 0) = 1 which
corresponds to zero min-entropy. In such a case instead of measuring with the setting a = 0 Alice can always just
return the outcome which is certain without making any measurement at all. In other words, she can measure
observable 1 . In [25] it was shown that if all the observables for one party are compatible (can be measured
simultaneously) than no-signaling, quantum and local bounds are the same. But 1 and any observable that is
measured for a = 1 are compatible, so the local bound cannot be violated even by no-signalling theory. QED.
D. Lowerbounding min-entropy of Eve
Theorem In the scenario presented above H∞(A|E) ≥
Robs−R(L)
2 ln 2 where Robs is the average value of the
CGLMP measured by the parties.
Proof Let us take a setting of Alice, say a = 0 such that maxA P (A|a = 0) = p and consider a procedure
similar to the one in lemma but with the outcome of the identity measurement set to the A for which this
maximum is reached. From lemma we know that in this case the bound R cannot be violated. However, it still
could be violated if for a = 0 measurement A0 different than 1 is used.
If the value of CGLMP for the strategy with A0 is
p00P (A ≤ B|a = 0, b = 0) + p01P (B ≤ A|a = 0, b = 1)+
p10P (A ≤ B|a = 1, b = 1) + p11P (B < A|a = 1, b = 0) = Q (20)
then the value for the strategy with 1 is at least
p
(
p00P (A ≤ B|a = 0, b = 0) + p01P (B ≤ A|a = 0, b = 1)
)
+
p10P (A ≤ B|a = 1, b = 1) + p11P (B < A|a = 1, b = 0) = (21)
Q− (1− p)
(
p00P (A ≤ B|a = 0, b = 0) + p01P (B ≤ A|a = 0, b = 1)
)
(22)
and this has to be lower or equal R. Because the outcome probabilities are bounded by 1 and the setting
probabilities by exponent of min-entropy we get
Q ≤ R+ (1− p)21−H∞ (23)
8or
p ≤ 1− 2H∞−1(Q−R). (24)
In an experiment repeated M times the min-entropy rate of Eve is
H∞(A|E) = −
1
M
log
M∏
i=1
pi = −
1
M
M∑
i=1
log pi (25)
≥
1
M2 ln 2
M∑
i=1
2H
i
∞(Qi −Ri) ≥
1
M2 ln 2
M∑
i=1
Qi −Ri (26)
≥
Robs −R(L)
2 ln 2
= H(L). (27)
Where in the last three inequalities we have used respectively: logarithm’s power series expansion, positivity
of min-entropy and formula (19). Bound H(L) is far from optimal since the approximations made are pretty
coarse. For a specific outcome alphabet much better bounds probably exist.
E. Nonperfect Correlations
In case one does not assume perfect correlations of the measurement outcomes in the rounds where Alice uses
basis 0 and Bob 2, due to noise in the system, the situation becomes a little more involved. The basic strategy
of Alice, as well as the improvement from higher dimensions remains the same.
In this case Eve’s resource is still L. If it is larger than 0 it means that some choices of the rounds where the
correlations are tested are more probable than the others. Her choice of strategy for each is a pair of numbers the
guessing probability p and the Bell expression expectation value I. They are connected by a relation pG ≤ f(I).
It follows directly from (24) that
p ≤ f(I) = 1− 2H∞−1(I −R(L)). (28)
These numbers for each round have to be chosen in advance and this choice depends on the probability dis-
tribution of the tested rounds. Whatever the strategy Eve chooses there is a choice of the test sample which
is optimal, from Eve’s point of view, for this strategy and for each choice of test sample there is an optimal
strategy.
There are two factors that Eve has to consider while choosing her strategy: The observed Bell inequality
violation and her average guessing probability of the bit of the key. Eve’s target is to maximize the latter while
keeping the former above a certain threshold. If L < 1 then there is some uncertainty in the choice of the
test sample and Eve cannot be sure that the choice will be optimal for her strategy. For every strategy we
can list all the choices of the sample according to the value of Eve’s target function in the decreasing order.
Her guessing probability is the weighted average of them and the only constraint on the weights (which are the
probabilities of choosing them as a sample) is that the largest is pmax2
H∞ = 2M(1−L), whereM is the amount of
bits necessary for the description of the test sample. This means that the best distribution of the probabilities
is (M,pmax)-flat.
Because the strategy of Eve is product, i.e. the numbers I and pG are chosen in advance for each round
and do not depend on the actual numbers produced by the generators, it is optimal for her to concentrate her
knowledge of the choice of the sample on the information about particular rounds rather than on the relations
between them. In other words, it is better for her to know that the sample will be surely tested in round 1
and with probability 50% in round 2 rather than knowing that it will be surely tested in exactly one of these
rounds; though the min-entropy is the same in both cases.
Therefore the most general strategy of Eve is to know a fraction a of all the rounds when the Bell inequality
is surely tested and a fraction b when it is surely not. If the tested fraction is f then, obviously, a ≤ f and
b ≤ 1− f .
The min-entropy loss is
L =
log
(
N
fN
)
− log
((1−a−b)N
(f−a)N
)
log
(
N
fN
) , (29)
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Robs ≤
a
f
βQM (L) +
f − a
f
I (30)
and Eve’s average guessing probability
pav =
b
1− f
+
1− f − b
1− f
pG. (31)
βQM is the maximal quantum violation of CGLMP with min-entropy loss rate L. It comes from the rounds
when Eve is sure that the testing takes place. In the rounds when she knows nothing she uses pG and I related
by (28). These equations can again be numerically solved for any given pair of L and Robs to optimize the
strategy and calculate the lower and upper bounds for security considerations. The basic mechanism behind
the advantage of higher dimensional systems however remains the same. We plan to extensively survey these
generalized scenarios, also including other types of randomness loss in future publications.
F. Error Correction and Privacy Amplification
The final stages of every key distribution protocol are Error Correction (EC) and Privacy Amplification (PA).
Their purpose is to provide Alice and Bob with a key which copies are identical for both parties and completely
unknown to Eve. These stages too require randomness and so far in all the works it has been assumed that this
randomness is perfect. If weak randomness is used it opens another avenue of eavesdropper’s attacks. In the
main text we mention this possibility and state that, since EC and PA are purely classical procedures, they lie
out of the scope of this paper. However, in forthcoming work we plan to include them in our analysis and prove
the following conjecture:
Conjecture 1 - In the scenario discussed in this paper EC and PA are possible if
H(L)−H(A|B) > L, (32)
where H(L) is given by formula (27), H(A|B) is the conditional Shannon entropy rate of Alice’s key conditioned
on Bob’s and L the min-entropy loss rate of their source.
